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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 19065 
JAY RICHARD NEWTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Aggravated 
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated <; 76-6-302, 1953 (as amended), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Dennis Frederick, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant, Jay Richard Newton was found guilty by a 
unanimous jury of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony. 
He was sentenced to be committed to the Utah State Prison for 
indeterminate term as provided by law on February 16, 1983. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 6, 1981, Sandra Shepard was working in her 
capacity as a registered pharmacist at Salt Lake Drug East, 
located at 1519 South 1500 East (T. 3). on that day Ms. 
Shepard was alone in the store ( T. 4), anc'I was working in the 
pharmacy area (T. 18), which had a raised floor and counter in 
front of it (T. 7). All of the lights were on in the 
drugstore and it was daylight (T. 7). 
At about 9:20 a.m., Ms. Shepard heard the door open 
and looked up. She saw a man enter the store (T. 16). She 
later identified this man as appellant (T. 13, 30). She went 
out of the pharmacy section to see what he wanted (T. 18). 
She had never seen him before (T. 14). 
Appellant was within arm's length of Ms. Shepard and 
stood directly in front of her (T. 21). Appellant then shoved 
Ms. Shepard back into the pharmacy (T. 5, 6). He told her he 
wanted all of her drugs, pulled out a gun (T. 4), and shoved 
it in her face (T. 5). 
He handed her a zippered case to put them in (T. 5, 
6). It was a flat, dark brown attache type case made out of 
naugahyde (T. 6). 
Appellant stood right next to Ms. Shepard and told 
her to hurry up. She began filling the case with drugs. 
Appellant wanted Dylotid, but she had none (T. R). Ms. 
Shepard completed filling up the case (T. 7). 
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Appellant then took the money out of the cash 
register (about $40-$50 were taken (T. 9) ), and started to 
leave. Appellant told Ms. Shepard to lay on the floor face 
down. He then ran out the front door (T. 9). 
Ms. Shepard got up and called the police (T. 9). 
upon the police's arrival approximately 15-20 minutes later 
(T. 22) Ms. Shepard gave the police the following description 
of the drugstore intruder: a white man with relatively long 
light brown hair. His height was 5'4"-5'5", and Shepard 
estimated his weight was 140 lbs. (T. 26). She told the 
police that the robber was wearing old, washed-out levis and 
had a jacket which was also made of washed-out levis (T. 4). 
The robber had left this jacket behind, and Ms. Shepard gave 
it to the police (T. 26). 
Ms. Shepard was shown two sets of black and white 
photographs. The first array consisted of six or seven 
photos. Ms. Shepard identified no one from that group. When 
the second array was presented a week to two weeks after the 
robbery (T. 12), however, Ms. Shepard positively identified 
appellant as the man who had robbed her (T. 13). 
Ms. Shepard subsequently identified appellant at the 
preliminary hearing and also or several occasions after that 
time in court (T. 30). 
Appellant was found guilty of aggravated robbery (T. 
53) by a unanimous jury(T. 54). He was committed to the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term as provided by law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POIIJT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RP.FUSED TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIOtlS ON THE 
NATURE OF AND REQUIREMENTS FOR EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE, 
Appellant contends that the eyewitness 
identification provided by Ms. Shepard was inadequate, He 
complains that her description to the police was sketchy and 
general; that she was too frightened to direct her attention 
to the appellant rather than the gun; and that her 
to observe the robber was limited. Appellant maintains that 
the inadequacy of this identification mandated a jury 
instruction on how to weigh the identification evidence.I 
Appellant claims that if the instruction had been given, 
would have been a reasonable likelihood that he would have 
been acquitted. 
Appellant's conclusion, however, is in error in 
light of the evidence showing that Ms. Shepard had sufficient 
time to observe appellant during the course of the robbery 
under excellent lighting conditions (T. 7). Shepard was able 
to positively identify appellant on several occasions (T. 13, 
30). A specific jury instruction on the nature of eyewitness 
1 Appellant requested two special jury instructions, both 
focusing on essentially the same elements. These 
instructions were based on instructions suggested by the 
court in united States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). 
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identification was therefore not required and was properly 
denied by the court. 
The test for the adequacy of eyewitness identication 
was explained in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), and was 
adopted by this Court in State v. Mccumber, Utah 622 P.2d 353 
(1980). The Biggers test determines the reliability of the 
iclentification by looking at the totality of the 
circumstances. Factors to consider in this analysis are the 
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of 
the crime, the witness's degree of attention, the accuracy of 
any prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty 
demonstrated during the identification procedure, and the time 
between the crime and the identification. When this test is 
applied to the instant case, it is clear that Ms. Shepard had 
no trouble in identifying appellant. 
Ms. Shepard had ample opportunity to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime. The store was brightly lit 
(T. 7) and appellant was the only person in the store besides 
Ms. Shepard (T. 4), undisturbed by other customers. She stood 
within an arm's length of appellant (T. 21), and was able to 
observe him the entire time of the robbery (T. 2 2). 
Admitted 1 y, Ms. Shepard was alarmed at the sight of the gun, 
but she did have an opportunity to observe appellant before 
drew the gun (T. 5), and a sufficient time after to closely 
observe him. Ms. Shepard was therefore able to direct a 
considerable amount of her attention towards appellant. 
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he 
Ms. Shepard's description of appellant did vary 
somewhat with his actual appearance but it was certainly 
understandable under the circumstances and was not so far 
removed from actuality to make it unlikely that appellant was 
the criminal. She described a white male with longish light 
brown hair, 5'5", and 140 lbs. (T. 26), or about the same 
height and weight as Ms. She pa rd. The record is not clear on 
this point, although it appears that appellant is slightly 
taller and heavier than this initial description. On the day 
of the robbery, however, Ms. Shepard was wearing shoes with 
heels 2 1/2 - 3" inches high, (T. 32) which would help to 
explain the possible discrepancy. When Ms. Shepard said he 
was close to her own height, her height on that day was 
approximately 5'8" rather than 5'5". 
Ms. Shepard's level of certainty is perhaps the most 
important part of her identification. Ms. Shepard 
consistently made positive identification of appellant in the 
photo array, at the preliminary hearing, and in court (T. 30), 
There was no doubt in her mind that appellant robbed her. Ms. 
Shepard may have been somewhat inexpert at verbalizing 
descriptions since she is not trained in such a skill or used 
to giving them, but she was certainly able to recognize 
appellant as the robber of the drugstore. 
The length of time between the crime and the 
photographic array was only a week to two weeks after the 
robbery (T. 28), a very short period of time. 
-6-
The Biggers, supra analysis thus leaves no room for 
doubt that Ms. Shepard could have been mistaken in her 
identification. There is certainly no serious doubt present 
in Ms. Shepard's identification of appellant which is the type 
of case that the Telfaire, supra, instructions contemplated. 
Therefore, appellant was not entitled to this particular jury 
instruction. No reasonable doubt as to the credibility of the 
evidence existed. 
Appellant repeatedly makes the point that eyewitness 
identification may sometimes be inaccurate. There is no doubt 
that this observation is true, but the fact remains that in 
this particular case, positive eyewitness identification was 
made with an absence of any evidence drawing these 
identifications into serious doubt. 
Since there was no significant question about the 
accuracy of the identification, no special instruction is 
required. Even the cases that appellant relies on agree with 
this proposition. United States v. Barber, 412 F.2d 517, 527 
(1rd. Cir. 1971) stated that: 
If there is a high degree of precision and 
certainty in his expression, which is 
consisted with any prior statements and 
unshaken on cross-examination, the 
statement of the witness may be regarded 
as a statement of fact. 
Under these circumstances, no identification instruction is 
required. 
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The court in State v. Warren, 63S r.2d 12n1 (Kan. 
1981) held that only where there is a serious question about 
the reliability of the identification should a cautionary 
instruction be given advising the jury as to the factors to 
considered in weighing the credibility of the eyewitness 
identification testimony. This point was explained in a later 
1 
Kansas case, State v. Brown, 638 P.2d 912 (Kan. 1QR2), where 
the court held that the eyewitness identification instruction 
was unnecessary. The court reasoned that even though 
eyewitness identification was a critical part of the case, 
there was no serious question about the reliability of the 
identification. 
Appellant quotes United States v. Telfaire, supra, 
to illustrate the dangers of identification testimony. Yet 
the instruction given hy the trial court in Telfaire was 
adequate and in no way prejudicial to the defendant. That 
instruction was similar to the instruction given in the 
instant case. It emphasized that the government had to prow 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took property with 
intent to steal; and that defendant was present at the time 
when, and at the place where, the offense was committed. The 
government had to prove all the elements. The court said that 
it was "satisfied that the attention of the jury was 
significantly focused on the issue of identity." Telfaire at 
556. The court also mentioned that the case presentea nonr ,,' 
the special difficulties often presented by inentification 
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testimony. The same is true of the instant case. 
Perhaps the most important reason for dismissing 
appellant's contention is that the jury instructions that were 
issued by the trial judge essentially focused on the critical 
factors contained in appellant's rejected instruction. The 
jury therefore was adequately instructed on the issue of the 
robber's identity and Ms. Shepard's credibility as a witness. 
The instructions that were given informed the jury 
that the state had to prove that appellant committed all of 
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable ooubt ( R. 
101), that the jury decides the weight of the evidence (R. 
105), and that it was not bound to believe what witnesses say 
(R. 105). The jury was further instructed that in evaluating 
the credibility of the witnesses that it could consider their 
deportment, the reasonableness of their statements, their 
frankness or candor, opportunity to know, ability to 
understand, and their capacity to remember (R. 106). The jury 
also was advised in making those determinations that it was to 
consider all the circumstances. Thus, the jury's attention 
was significantly directed towards the Telfaire - type of 
considerations with respect to the issue of the defendant's 
ioentity. If the purpose of appellant's requested 
instructions were aoequately covered in the instructions that 
were actually given, appellant has no cause to complain. This 
Court in State v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (1980) 
made the following statement: 
-'l-
The principal point of rlefenrlant's 
proposed instruction dealt with the 
state's burden of proof and the factors to 
be considered in weighing the testimony of 
the eyewitness. All of the factors were 
adequately dealt with in other 
instruct ions presented to the i ury by the 
trial court. As a result, we cannot agree 
that the rlenial of the proposed 
instruction constituted reversible error. 
As appellant pointed out, the Mccumber opinion does not 
disclose which instruction was actually given to the jury, so 
no direct comparison of the instruction of Mccumber can be 
made with those of the instant case to test for their 
adequacy. However, another Utah case, State v. Schaffer, 
Utah, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (1981) was more explicit. In 
Schaffer, defendant wanted the same type of instruction as the 
appellant wanted in the instant case. In discussing the 
instructions that were actually given, the Court made this 
observation: 
Here, the jury was instructed that the 
burden was on the State to prove defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
they were the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and that, in 
order to convict, they must find that 
defendant committed all of the elements 
constituting the offense. Taking these 
instructions as a whole, as is proper • 
we find that they adequately advised the 
jury on the law pertaining to this case. 
In the instant case, these same instructions were given. This 
leads to the conclusion that, as in Schaffer, the trial co11rt 
sufficiently advised the jury of both the appropriate law tlidt 
should apply to the facts of the case and the factors 
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involved in reviewing the evidence adduced at trial. 
Appellant points to the fact that the Telfaire 
instruction has been adopted in many jurisdictions. This is 
true, but it is also true that a significant number of state 
courts follow the rule that a trial court may in its 
discretion refuse to give a requested instruction when the 
other instructions given adequately and correctly state the 
applicable law and alert the jury to its responsibilities as 
factfinder. 
Moreover, whether to give the specific instruction 
lies within the judge's discretion. State v Malmrose, Utah, 
649 P.2d 56 (1982). The discretion was not abused when there 
was no need for the instructions since they were covered in 
substance by the instruction given. People v. Estorga, 612 
P.2d 520 (Colo. 1980). There were no unusual circumstances in 
the prosecution that would indicate an abuse of discretion. 
The court in State v. Rovles, 598 P.2d 1249, 1252 
(Or. App. 1979) made the following statement concerning the 
discretion which accompanies the giving of eyewitness 
identification instructions: 
"Generally, the decision as to 
whether to give an instruction on the 
reliability of eyewitness identification 
will depend on the trial judge's 
perception of its desirability in each 
case. Here it was not an abuse of the 
trial judge's discretion to refuse to give 
it. In fact, except in unusual 
circumstances, it should not be given. 
Following the Rovles rationale, there were no unusual 
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circumstances in the case at bar which compellecl the giving a 
Telfaire instruction. 
Appellant contends that this Court has never sairl 
the instruct ion is improper and should never be given. The 
instructions will not be consiclered improper if the court 
below adequately states the law as applied to the case at 
hand, merely because a requested instruction constitutes a 
correct statement of the law, does not mean that it should be 
given. It will do more harm than good if it is redunclant. A 
defendant is not entitled to an instruction which is reclundant 
or repetitive of principles enunciated in other instructions, 
State v. Mccumber, supra. Repetition of instruction under 
various forms should be discouraged Clews v. People, 377 P.2d 
125 (Colo. 1962). 
Appellant also maintain that this court has implied 
that under certain circumstances these instructions would be 
proper. The only time the giving of the instructions would 
proper (and which apparently has yet to occur) would be when 
no other instructions adequately covering the issue were 
given. 
Appellant further states that he is entitled to have 
his theory of the case presented to the jury in the form of 
written instructions, This statement is true. Appellant has 
nothing to complain of on this coun, however, because the 
instructions which were issued informed the jury of 
appellant's theory. This Court in State v. Schaffer, 
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was confronted with a similar argument. The Court responded 
thusly: 
Defendant also complains of the trial 
court's failure to give his proposed 
instruction on identification testimony. 
Defendant maintains that identification 
was the only issue in his case, and cites 
Utah authority to the effect that a 
defendant is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case. 
Here, the jury was instructed that the 
burden was on the state to prove defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
they were the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses, and that, in 
order to convict, they must find that 
defendant committed all of the elements 
constituting the offense. Taking these 
instructions as a whole, as is proper, 
we find that they adequately advised the 
jury on the law pertaining to this case. 
The same analysis applies to the instant case. 
Furthermore, no prejudicial error occurs if the 
giving of the requested instruction would not have affected 
the outcome of the trial, State v. Mccumber, supra; State v. 
Bell, Utah, 563 P.2d 186 (1977). Appellant has not 
demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different if the instruction had been given. Therefore, even 
if the instruction should have been given, no reversible error 
occurred. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly denied appellant's 
requested instructions on eyewitness i<ientification. 
not per se improper, the proposed instructions were 
nevertheless redundant of those instructions which were given 
to jury and therefore totally unnecessary. The instructions 
the jury received adequately advised them of the potential 
problems of eyewitness identification. 
Those jurisdictions that routinely allow the 
Telfaire type of instructions which appellant requested 
maintain that such instruction are not needed when 
identification is not a serious question in the case. Here, 
the witness, Ms. Shepard, had the time and opportunity to view 
appellant during the course of the drugstore robbery and her 
consistent positive identifications of appellant as the person 
who robbed the drugstore was not contradicted. 
Finally, any error that may have occurred from the 
failure to give the instruction was harmless. The judgment of 
the trial court should therefore be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this of November, 
19 83. 
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